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Abstract
Migration presents sweeping societal challenges that have
recently attracted significant attention from the scientific com-
munity. One of the prominent approaches that have been sug-
gested employs optimization and machine learning to match
migrants to localities in a way that maximizes the expected
number of migrants who find employment. However, it relies
on a strong additivity assumption that, we argue, does not hold
in practice, due to competition effects; we propose to enhance
the data-driven approach by explicitly optimizing for these
effects. Specifically, we cast our problem as the maximization
of an approximately submodular function subject to matroid
constraints, and prove that the worst-case guarantees given by
the classic greedy algorithm extend to this setting. We then
present three different models for competition effects, and
show that they all give rise to submodular objectives. Finally,
we demonstrate via simulations that our approach leads to
significant gains across the board.
1 Introduction
Migration is one of the greatest societal challenges facing
humanity in the 21st Century. In 2015 there were 244 mil-
lion international migrants in the world, suggesting a larger
increase in the rate of international migration than was previ-
ously anticipated (McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2018). A key reason
behind this increase is the widely understood fact that migra-
tion often has significant benefits to the migrants and their
families, as well as the host country and the country of origin.
For example, migrants working in the United States earn
wages that are higher by a median factor of 4.11 than those
they would have earned in their home countries (Clemens,
Montenegro, and Prichett, 2008); and the money they send
back to their countries of origin is a reliable source of for-
eign currency. But the increase in the rate of migration is
also driven by globalization, social disparities, and, in no
small part, by a vast number of refugees — including, most
recently, millions who have fled war in Syria, persecution in
Myanmar, and economic calamity in Venezuela.
These events have fueled a surge of attempts to put migra-
tion, and, especially, refugee resettlement, on scientific foot-
ing. Alvin Roth, a Nobel laureate in economics, nicely sum-
marizes the problem in a 2015 opinion piece (Roth, 2015):
“Refugee relocation is what economists call a match-
ing problem, in the sense that different refugees will
thrive differently in different countries. Determining
who should go where, and not just how many go to each
country, should be a major goal of relocation policy.”
This observation underlies work in market design, which
draws on the extensive literature on matching problems such
as school choice. It focuses on refugee resettlement mech-
anisms that elicit refugees’ preferences over localities, and
output a matching that is desirable with respect to these pref-
erences (Moraga and Rapoport, 2014; Jones and Teytelboym,
2018; Delacre´taz, Kominers, and Teytelboym, 2016).
By contrast, a recent paper by Bansak et al. (2018), pub-
lished in Science, takes a markedly different, data-driven
approach to refugee resettlement, which employs machine
learning and optimization. Their goal is to maximize the
expected number of refugees who find employment.1 Us-
ing historical data from the United States and Switzerland,
they train predictors that estimate the probability pi` that a
given refugee i would find employment in a given locality
`. The optimal solution is then an assignment of refugees to
localities that maximizes the sum of probabilities, subject to
capacity constraints. Assuming their predictions of employ-
ment probabilities are accurate, Bansak et al. demonstrate
that their approach leads to a 40%–70% increase in the num-
ber of employed refugees, compared to the actual outcomes
in the United States and Switzerland.
On a high level, we subscribe to the data-driven approach,
and believe that the assumptions made by Bansak et al. (2018)
are quite reasonable in the context of refugee resettlement —
most notably, the implicit assumption that the probability pi`
can be estimated based only on information about the refugee
i and the locality `, and does not depend on where other
refugees are assigned. But as this approach gains traction, we
envision it being deployed on a larger scale, and ultimately
informing international migration policy more broadly, espe-
cially in the context of labor migration.
The key observation behind our work is that, at that scale,
competition effects would invalidate the foregoing assump-
tion. Indeed, the larger the number of, say, engineers, who
settle in a specific area, the less likely it is that any particular
1To be precise, they consider families and maximize the expected
number of families such that at least one member is employed, but
this does not make a significant technical difference, so we focus on
individuals for ease of exposition.
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engineer would find a job. The immigration of approximately
331,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel in 1990
and 1991 serves as a case in point. A disproportionate num-
ber of these highly-educated immigrants were engineers and
doctors, leading to a saturation of the local job markets: “a
state with an oversupply of doctors could not possibly double
the number of its doctors in several years” (Smooha, 2008).
Our goal in this paper, therefore, is to enhance the data-driven
approach to migration by explicitly modeling competition
effects, and directly optimizing for them.
1.1 Our Approach and Results
On a technical level, our objective function f receives a set
of migrant-locality pairs as input, and returns the predicted
number of employed migrants under the corresponding as-
signment. Crucially, we assume that f is (monotone) sub-
modular: individual elements provide diminishing marginal
returns. Formally, if S and T are two subsets of migrant-
locality pairs such that S ⊆ T , and (i, `) is a migrant-locality
pair such that (i, `) /∈ T , then
f(S ∪ {(i, `)})− f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ {(i, `)})− f(T ).
This captures the idea that the larger the number of migrants
that compete with i for a job at locality `, the less likely it is
that i herself would find employment — especially if it is a
skilled job — and the smaller the marginal contribution of
(i, `) to the objective function (overall number of migrants
who find employment).
We can therefore cast our optimization problem as the
maximization of a monotone submodular function subject to
matching constraints, which represent caps on the number
of migrants each locality can absorb.2 In fact, we allow the
objective function to be approximately submodular since
most ways of estimating employment for a matching will
introduce noise that invalidates submodularity.
The matching constraints in question can be naturally de-
scribed as the intersection of two matroids. In Section 3, we
show that a simple greedy algorithm — which is known
to perform well when given access to an exactly sub-
modular function — gives an approximation guarantee of
(P + 1 + 4 1− k)
−1 when maximizing a submodular func-
tion f subject to P many matroids if we only have access
to an -approximately submodular function approximating
f and if k is the size of the largest set in the intersection of
the matroids. We expect this result to be of independent use.
In our setting, it gives us a guarantee — for P = 2 — on
the performance of our greedy matching with respect to the
optimal matching.
The submodular objective function can potentially be
learned, or optimized directly, from historical data (Balcan
and Harvey, 2018; Balkanski, Rubinstein, and Singer, 2016)
without any further structural assumptions. As an alternative,
in Section 4, we propose three models of how migrants find
employment, all of which induce submodular objective func-
tions. The purpose of these models is twofold: First, they
2Capacity constraints can be transformed into matching con-
straints on the complete bipartite graph with migrants on one side,
and localities on the other, where the number of copies of each
locality is equal to its capacity.
represent different ways in which competition effects might
arise, thereby helping to understand them. Second, in practice
they may prove to be more accurate as they are defined by
relatively few parameters, and are easier to train.
In Section 5, we compare the employment generated by
the greedy heuristic on the submodular model to the baseline
approach of assuming additivity. We find that the benefits of
accounting for submodularity almost always outweigh the
loss associated with using an inexact optimization technique.
Across our three models and a variety of settings, the greedy
approach frequently increases employment by 10% and more,
suggesting that substantial gains can be made in practice.
1.2 Related Work
Our work is most closely related to that of Ahmed, Dicker-
son, and Fuge (2017). Motivated by diversity in problems
such as movie recommendation and assignment of papers to
reviewers, they formulate a weighted bipartite b-matching
problem with a specific submodular objective, which is sim-
ilar to our problem under a particular instantiation of the
retroactive-correction model. They show that this problem
can be formulated as a quadratic program (which may be
intractable at a large scale). They also use the greedy algo-
rithm, but only note in passing that it would give worst-case
guarantees in a degenerate special case that essentially coin-
cides with having no constraints. By contrast, our worst-case
guarantees of Section 3 hold for any approximately submod-
ular objective function under capacity constraints, or even
under an arbitrary number of matroid constraints. Another
key difference is that Ahmed, Dickerson, and Fuge focus on
one specific objective function, whereas our results of Sec-
tion 4 explore several different models, which are tailored to
the migration domain. Perhaps the most striking difference is
more fundamental: For Ahmed, Dickerson, and Fuge, diver-
sity is an objective that is orthogonal to (additive) efficiency.
By contrast, we consider diversity as an inherent part of effi-
ciency since matchings lacking in diversity will suffer from
competition effects.
A bit further afield, there is a large body of work on sub-
modular optimization, and its applications in AI. The papers
of Fisher, Nemhauser, and Wolsey (1978) and Horel and
Singer (2016) are especially relevant — we discuss their re-
sults in Section 3. Applications of submodular optimization
include influence in social networks (Kempe, Kleinberg, and
Tardos, 2003), sensor placement (Krause et al., 2008), and
human computation (Shahaf and Horvitz, 2010), just to name
a few.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a set of agents or migrants, and L be a set of
localities. Each locality ` has a capacity of q` ∈ N, limiting
the number of migrants it is willing to accept. A matching is
a set S ⊆ N × L of migrant-locality pairs, such that every
agent is matched to at most one locality and every locality `
to at most q` migrants. Our general aim is to find matchings
that maximize a given function f : 2N×L → R≥0, which
assigns a utility to every matching.
In this paper, we will assume that f is either submodular or
approximately submodular. To be submodular, f must satisfy
for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N×L and x /∈ T that f(S∪{x})−f(S) ≥
f(T ∪{x})−f(T ). To prove submodularity, it is sufficient to
show the above for T being of the shape S ∪ {y} with y /∈ S.
A function f is supermodular iff (−f) is submodular, i.e., iff
f(S ∪ {x})− f(S) ≤ f(T ∪ {x})− f(T ) for appropriate
S, T and x. We will assume all submodular functions to be
monotone and normalized, i.e., f(∅) = 0.
A function f is -approximately submodular for some
 > 0 if and only if there is a submodular function fˆ such
that (1− ) fˆ(S) ≤ f(S) ≤ (1 + ) fˆ(S). Note that f itself
need not be monotone.
A (finite) matroid is a pair (G,F) of a finite ground set G
and a set F ⊆ 2G of independent sets such that (i) ∅ ∈ F ,
(ii) if S ∈ F , then every subset T of S is also inF , and (iii) if
S, T ∈ F such that |S| = |T |+ 1, there is some x ∈ S \ T
such that T ∪ {x} ∈ F . For any set S ⊆ G, let its rank r(S)
denote the size of the largest independent subset of S, and
let its span sp(S) be the set of all elements x ∈ G such that
r(S) = r(S ∪ {x}). An important class of matroids are the
partition matroids that partition the ground setG into disjoint
subsets G1, . . . , Gk and designate S ⊆ G as independent iff
|S ∩Gi| is at most some cap gi for all i.
3 Algorithmic Results
Both the constraint of matching each agent to at most one
locality and the constraint induced by locality quotas easily
translate into partition matroids over N × L.3 In the first
matroid, we restrict a matching to select at most one edge
out of the set of edges incident to each agent i; in the second
matroid, to at most q` edges out of the set of edges incident
to each locality `. Then, the matchings are exactly the sets
that are independent in both matroids. Therefore, maximizing
employment among matchings is an instance of maximizing a
submodular function subject to multiple matroid constraints.
To optimize for employment, we must choose a way of pre-
dicting it under a given matching. For instance, we might use
techniques from machine learning to generalize past obser-
vations about employment success. Alternatively, we might
adopt a hand-crafted model — such as the ones presented in
Section 4 — and set only its parameters based on data. The
latter approach ensures that our predictor behaves reasonably
on all inputs and requires less data for fitting.
However we choose to predict employment, the corre-
sponding employment function will have a fairly compli-
cated shape. As a result, we face the obstacle that optimizing
the function exactly would be impractical from a computa-
tional viewpoint. Fortunately, Fisher, Nemhauser, and Wolsey
(1978) found that a simple greedy algorithm gives an ap-
proximation guarantee of 1P+1 when optimizing a monotone,
submodular function z subject to P matroid constraints.4
Furthermore, in practice, the same greedy algorithm has been
3We can even deal with migrant-locality incompatibilities, by
removing incompatible pairs from the ground set.
4Lee et al. (2010) report a polynomial-time algorithm that
achieves an approximation ratio of 1
P+
for P ≥ 2 partition ma-
troids, where  can be made arbitrarily small. However, the degree
of the polynomial grows very fast as  becomes smaller, making
their algorithm impractical for our purposes.
found to perform much better than this theoretical guaran-
tee, often giving results that are close to optimal (Kempe,
Kleinberg, and Tardos, 2003).
Call the matroidsMp = (N,Fp) for 1 ≤ p ≤ P , let spp
denote the span with respect toMp, and let the intersection
of the matroids be F := ⋂Pp=1Fp. To refer to the marginal
contribution of an element j with respect to a set S, we set
ρj(S) := z(S ∪ {j})− z(S).
The greedy algorithm initializes S0 ← ∅, N0 ← N and
t← 1. Then, it proceeds through the following steps, wherein
t denotes the number of the current iteration:
Step 0. If N t−1 = ∅, stop with St−1 as the greedy solution.
Step 1. Select i(t) ∈ N t−1 for which z(St−1 ∪ {i(t)}) is
maximal, with ties settled arbitrarily.
Step 2a. If St−1 ∪ {i(t)} /∈ F , set N t−1 ← N t−1 \ {i(t)}
and return to step 0.
Step 2b. If St−1 ∪ {i(t)} ∈ F , set ρt−1 ← ρi(t)(St−1),
St ← St−1 ∪ {i(t)}, and N t ← N t−1 \ {i(t)}.
Step 3. Set t← t+ 1 and continue from step 0.
Although the greedy algorithm is an effective way of max-
imizing submodular functions, we are unlikely to have direct
access to the submodular function we are interested in, even
for the value queries required for the greedy algorithm. If
we adopt a machine-learning approach, our predictor might
get reasonably close to the real employment function but is
unlikely to be exactly monotone and submodular. The same
problem presents itself even for the hand-crafted models:
While we prove that each model induces a perfectly submod-
ular function, this function is defined as the expectation over
a random process. For scenarios of nontrivial size, we can
only estimate this function through repeated sampling, and
the introduced noise may invalidate the monotonicity and
submodularity of the function. In both cases, we can only
expect our functions to be approximately submodular.
Fortunately, the greedy algorithm still performs well if
z is only approximately submodular. We adapt the classic
result by Fisher, Nemhauser, and Wolsey (1978) to show the
following approximation guarantee.
Theorem 3.1. Let z : 2N → R be -approximately sub-
modular and let zˆ be the underlying (monotone, normalized)
submodular function, i.e., let
(1− ) zˆ(S) ≤ z(S) ≤ (1 + ) zˆ(S)
for all S ⊆ N . Let F be the intersection of P matroids, and
let k denote the size of the largest S ∈ F . Then the greedy
algorithm selects a set S ∈ F such that(
P + 1 +
4 
1−  k
)
zˆ(S) ≥ max
S′∈F
zˆ(S′).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to give ap-
proximation bounds for optimizing approximately submod-
ular functions subject to multiple matroid constraints. For
a single matroid, Horel and Singer (2016) give a slightly
sharper bound of (2 + 2 1− k) zˆ(S) ≥ maxS′ zˆ(S′), but their
proof makes use of strong properties that only hold if P = 1.
By contrast, in order to capture our matching constraints we
need to take the intersection of two matroids, that is, for our
application P = 2, and the corresponding worst-case approx-
imation guarantee is roughly 1/3 — assuming  is sufficiently
small. This is a realistic assumption, especially in our hand-
crafted models, as standard concentration inequalities imply
that sampling leads to exponentially fast convergence to the
true function value.
Turning to the proof, let U t be the set of elements consid-
ered in the first t+ 1 iterations except for the element added
to S in iteration t+ 1, i.e., U t := N \N t. We make use of
the following known results.
Lemma 3.2 (Fisher, Nemhauser, and Wolsey 1978). For all
t, U t ⊆ ⋃Pp=1 spp(St).
Lemma 3.3 (Fisher, Nemhauser, and Wolsey 1978). Let
ρi, σi ≥ 0 be given for i = 0, . . . ,K − 1 such that∑t−1
i=0 σi ≤ t for t = 1, . . . ,K, and the sequence (ρi)i
decreases monotonically. Then,
K−1∑
i=0
ρi σi ≤
K−1∑
i=0
ρi.
We are now ready for the theorem’s proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let Tˆ be a maximizing subset for zˆ
and let S be the set returned by the greedy mechanism when
run on z. Let K = |S| and define Rt−1 := Tˆ ∩ (U t \U t−1),
rt−1 = |Rt−1|, for t = 1, . . . ,K. Without loss of generality,
all elements of the ground set can actually appear in a set
S ∈ F , thus U0 = ∅.
Let ρˆj(S) be the marginal contribution of j with respect
to S and the function zˆ. If ρt−1 was set in the algorithm as
ρi(t)(S
t−1), let ρˆt−1 denote ρˆi(t)(St−1).
By submodularity of zˆ, it holds that
zˆ(Tˆ ) ≤ zˆ(S) +
∑
j∈Tˆ
ρˆj(S). (1)
We can bound the second term as∑
j∈Tˆ
ρˆj(S)
=
K∑
t=1
∑
j∈Rt−1
ρˆj(S)
≤
K∑
t=1
∑
j∈Rt−1
ρˆj(S
t−1) (submodularity, St−1 ⊆ S)
≤
K∑
t=1
∑
j∈Rt−1
z(St−1 ∪ {j})
1−  −
K∑
t=1
∑
j∈Rt−1
zˆ(St−1).
The greedy algorithm chose i(t) as the element j ∈ N t−1 =
N \ U t−1 with maximum z(St−1 ∪ {j}), thus
≤ 1
1− 
K∑
t=1
∑
j∈Rt−1
z(St−1 ∪ {i(t)})−
K∑
t=1
∑
j∈Rt−1
zˆ(St−1)
≤ 1 + 
1− 
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St)−
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St−1)
=
K∑
t=1
rt−1 ρˆt−1 +
2 
1− 
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St). (2)
We claim that for all t = 1, . . . ,K,
∑t
i=1
ri−1
P ≤ t. In-
deed,
t∑
i=1
ri−1 = |Tˆ ∩ U t|.
Since, by Lemma 3.2, U t ⊆ ⋃Pp=1spp(St), it follows that
t∑
i=1
ri−1 ≤
P∑
p=1
|Tˆ ∩ spp(St)|.
Because Tˆ is independent in the matroid (N,Fp), and be-
cause the rank of spp(St) is t, |Tˆ ∩ spp(St)| ≤ t. Thus,∑t
i=1 ri−1 ≤ P t, and the claim follows.
From the sequence (ρˆt−1)t, form a new sequence (ρ¯t−1)t,
where
ρ¯t−1 := min
1≤t′≤t
ρˆt′−1.
Clearly, this sequence decreases monotonically and is non-
negative. Fix some t and let t′ = argmin1≤t′≤t ρˆt′−1. Then,
we can relate ρˆt−1 and ρ¯t−1 as follows:
ρˆt−1 = ρˆi(t)(St−1)
≤ ρˆi(t)(St
′−1) (submodularity of zˆ, t′ ≤ t)
= zˆ(St
′−1 ∪ {i(t)})− zˆ(St′−1)
≤ z(S
t′−1 ∪ {i(t)})
1−  − zˆ(S
t′−1)
≤ z(S
t′−1 ∪ {i(t′)})
1−  − zˆ(S
t′−1)
(greedy chose i(t′) over i(t) in iteration t′)
≤ 1 + 
1−  zˆ(S
t′−1 ∪ {i(t′)})− zˆ(St′−1)
= ρˆt′−1 +
2 
1−  zˆ(S
t′)
≤ ρˆt′−1 + 2 
1−  zˆ(S
t) (monotonicity)
= ρ¯t−1 +
2 
1−  zˆ(S
t) (def. of ρ¯t−1, choice of t′).
By Lemma 3.3, we know that
K∑
t=1
rt−1 ρ¯t−1 = P
K∑
t=1
rt−1
P
ρ¯t−1 ≤ P
K∑
t=1
ρ¯t−1. (3)
This allows us to continue Eq. (2):
K∑
t=1
rt−1 ρˆt−1 +
2 
1− 
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St)
≤
K∑
t=1
rt−1
(
ρ¯t−1 +
2 
1−  zˆ(S
t)
)
+
2 
1− 
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St)
≤ P
K∑
t=1
ρ¯t−1 +
4 
1− 
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St) (Eq. 3)
≤ P
K∑
t=1
ρˆt−1 +
4 
1− 
K∑
t=1
rt−1 zˆ(St) (def. of ρ¯t−1)
≤ P zˆ(S) + 4 
1−  |Tˆ | zˆ(S)
≤ P zˆ(S) + 4 
1− k zˆ(S).
Combining this with Eq. (1) yields
zˆ(Tˆ ) ≤
(
P + 1 +
4 
1− k
)
zˆ(S).
4 Submodular Objectives
We propose three models for the submodular effects of com-
petition between migrants. Each of them makes different
assumptions about how migrants find their jobs and, thus,
about how they compete with each other. In each model we
are interested in the expected employment function that it
induces, i.e., the function that takes as input agent-locality
pairs, and outputs the expected number of agents that find em-
ployment (in each case this function depends on parameters
of the model).
4.1 The Retroactive-Correction Model
The easiest of our models generalizes the additive model
used by Bansak et al. (2018), by retroactively correcting
employment success for competition. We assume that the
agents N can be partitioned into disjoint professions pi, and
that only agents of the same profession compete for jobs.
Each agent i has a probability pi` of finding employment in
locality `.
In the additive model, one can imagine each migrant’s job
search as a coin with a bias of this probability; the employ-
ment is the number of successful coin flips, and, therefore, the
expected employment is just the sum of probabilities pi` over
all matched pairs of agents i and localities `. In this model,
however, the coin flip only simulates an agent’s attempt to
qualify for being hired, not her chance of actually landing a
job, since the latter is influenced by other agents. An agent
might qualify by means of language acquisition, by trans-
ferring degrees, through further professional training, or by
choosing a good way to present herself to prospective employ-
ers. The actual employment at a locality ` and in a profession
pi is obtained by applying a concave and monotone correction
function C`pi : N→ R≥0 to the number of qualifying agents.
Total employment is computed by summing up employment
over all localities and professions; the submodular function
to optimize for is the expected employment generated by
this process. While there is no direct competition between
agents of different professions, a matching algorithm cannot
simply treat them in isolation since different professions have
to share the locality caps.
An easy example for a correction function might be
x 7→ min(x, c) for some constant c. This models the sce-
nario where there are c jobs in that locality and profession,
and where the job market manages to bring all qualifying
agents into work, up to the hard cap of c. Other functions
might slow down their growth before hitting the cap, simulat-
ing inefficiencies in the job market.
Observation 4.1. The expected employment function in-
duced by the retroactive-correction model is submodular.
To see this, it is enough to show submodularity for a single
locality ` and profession pi since a sum of submodular func-
tions is submodular. Because all agent-locality pairs have `
as the second component, we can identify them with their
agents. For a set S of agents and two other agents x and y, we
need to show that the marginal contribution of x is at least as
high with respect to S as it is with respect to S ∪{y}. Fix the
coin flips for all agents. If x failed, her marginal contribution
is zero in both cases. If y failed, the marginal contribution
of x is the same whether y is present or not. If both succeed,
the marginal contribution must be at least as high with re-
spect to the smaller set than with respect to the larger one by
the concavity of C`pi . Since employment in the case without
fixed coin flips can be seen as a convex combination of em-
ployment in the cases with fixed coin tosses, submodularity
is preserved.
4.2 The Interview Model
In the second model, we again partition agents by profession.
In contrast to the previous model, a migrant’s employment
success is not determined by a single hurdle of qualification
but through a sequence of applications to individual jobs.
Each locality ` has a certain number k`pi of jobs for profession
pi, and each agent i ∈ N has a probability pi` of being
accepted at a particular job of their profession at locality `.
Employment is calculated individually for each locality `
and profession pi. Initially, there are k`pi many jobs available.
Then, we iterate over agents of profession pi matched with
locality ` in an order selected uniformly at random. For agent
i, we throw pi`-biased coins until we either hit success or until
we have failed as many times as the number of available jobs.
Each of these coin tosses represents the agent applying for
one of the remaining jobs, where each application succeeds
with probability pi`. If one of the tosses succeeds, this agent is
counted as employed, and the process continues with one less
job available. Else, the agent is not employed, and the number
of available jobs remains the same for the next agent. The
utility of a matching is the sum over localities and professions
of the expected number of employed agents in that locality
and profession.
Theorem 4.2. The expected employment function induced
by the interview model is submodular.
In contrast to our other models, it is quite nontrivial to
establish submodularity in the interview model. The proof of
Theorem 4.2 is relegated to Appendix A.
4.3 The Coordination Model
Our final model goes beyond the strict separation between
professions, and assumes that employment for all agents in
the same locality is coordinated. Similarly to the previous
model, each locality ` has a number k` of jobs, and each
agent i has a certain probability pij of being compatible with
a specific job j. These probabilities might be induced by a
strict partition into professions, but can be more fluid with
people being more or less qualified for jobs closer to or fur-
ther from their areas of expertise. Whereas, in the interview
model, a migrant directly takes a job as soon as she is found
eligible, we now determine compatibility between all mi-
grants and jobs in `, and we coordinate the assignment such
that employment is maximized.
To calculate employment at a locality `, we flip a coin
with bias pij for each agent i matched to ` and each job j
at `. By drawing an edge between each pair (i, j) whose
coin flip succeeded, we obtain a bipartite graph. Employment
at this locality is the size of a maximum matching, which
corresponds to the highest number of agents that can be given
work. Again, the total utility of a matching is the sum of
expected employment over localities.
Theorem 4.3. The expected employment function induced
by the coordination model is submodular.
The relatively simple proof of the theorem builds up on a
result by Rabanca (2016) and appears in Appendix B.
5 Simulations
The approximation results of Section 3 provide a way of
respecting competition effects when matching migrants to
localities. But when is it worth adopting such an approach?
After all, besides the potential benefits, embracing submodu-
larity also entails an increase in modeling complexity, and it
forces us to abandon the efficient optimization tools that are
applicable to additive optimization.
If one chooses not to deal with these drawbacks, one can
always just ignore submodularity: For each agent and locality,
one may estimate the probability of her finding employment
at this place in the absence of all other agents. One can then
optimize the additive function induced by the aformentioned
probabilities, say, by formulating the problem as an integer
linear program, and hope that the result would do well under
the true objective function. The approach of Bansak et al.
(2018) can be understood as doing exactly this. Our goal is
to show that — when competition effects are indeed present,
and the objective function is submodular — accounting for
submodularity is almost always the preferable choice and
can lead to significantly better outcomes than the additive ap-
proach described above. To this end, we empirically evaluate
the two approaches on all three models from Section 4.
Our simulation code is written in Python; we use Gurobi
for additive optimization and IGraph for computing max-
imum bipartite matchings. All code is open source and
available for reproduction at https://github.com/pgoelz/
migration. We provide additional simulation results in Ap-
pendix C, where we also link to IPython notebooks with the
exact setup of all of our experiments.
For increased performance, we reuse estimations of ex-
pected employment. When a model is queried with a match-
ing that puts the same agents of profession pi — or just the
same agents in case of the coordination model — in the same
locality ` as a previous matching, the previous estimation
of expected employment is used. Since all these estimations
are obtained by averaging many random simulations, this
should not significantly influence the experiments. Further-
more, since the additive algorithm is not affected, and since
all final utility values are computed without memoization,
this only disadvantages the greedy algorithm, strengthening
our findings.
Due to the high number of parameters in all of our models,
we adopt a standard setting that is applicable across all of
them. Let N be a set of 100 agents, split equally between two
professions, 1 and 2. While we vary the number of localities,
we distribute 100 jobs — 50 per profession — randomly over
the localities, ensuring that each locality has at least one job.
Furthermore, we set the capacity of each locality to exactly
its number of jobs. Finally, we average 1 000 simulations
to estimate expected employment whenever our models are
queried with a matching.
We quickly sketch how this setting translates into the id-
iosyncrasies of our individual models: In the retroactive-
correction model, for each agent i, we uniformly select a
probability between 0 and 1, which is used as pi` for all
localities `. We choose to keep these probabilities equal be-
tween localities to make sure that our samples will contain
agents that have significantly different overall chances of
being employed, an aspect that we would expect to see in
any real dataset. As the correction function for a locality `
and profession pi, we choose x 7→ min(x, c), where c is the
number of available jobs in ` and pi. Note that, while the
cap ensures that the number of agents in a locality is at most
the total number of jobs, the number of agents of a certain
profession can exceed the number of jobs in that profession,
which lets the cap c kick in. Likewise, in the interview model,
we choose pi` uniformly at random and equal over all locali-
ties. Finally, we induce the compatibility probabilities in the
coordination model by the professions, i.e., each agent has a
single compatibility probability chosen uniformly at random
for all jobs of her profession and is incompatible with all
other jobs.
As shown in Fig. 1, the greedy algorithm outperforms ad-
ditive optimization in nearly all cases, frequently increasing
employment by 10% and more. Given the wide range of
scenarios that are randomly generated, it is striking that the
greedy heuristic virtually never leads to worse employment
than additive maximization. This trend persists over all set-
tings that we simulated. While the advantage of the greedy
algorithm does not seem as pronounced for small numbers
of localities in the retroactive-correction model, it leads to
strong improvements over all locality numbers in the other
two models.
In the following, we set the number of localities to 10
and vary the number of agents n — still equally split be-
tween professions — instead. Each locality has a capacity
of n/10 and has n/10 jobs, where the n/2 jobs of each
profession are randomly distributed within these constraints.
Figure 2 shows that the greedy algorithm leads to impres-
sive improvements across all simulated numbers of agents,
again especially pronounced in the interview and coordi-
nation models. While the gains become smaller for high
numbers of agents in the correction model, the reason is in-
nocuous: Looking at the absolute utilities instead of the ratio,
we see that in these scenarios both additive and greedy get
very close to an employment of half of the agents, which is
the expected number of qualifying agents and thus optimal
(see Appendix C.2).
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Figure 1: Increase in utility by using greedy instead of additive by number of localities. Each dot represents a new instantiation
of the standard setting for the corresponding model, to which we applied both algorithms. Outliers are indicated by arrows.
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Figure 2: Improvements for different numbers of agents split
across 10 localities.
In Appendices C.3 to C.5, we vary further parameters,
namely the number of professions, the level of specialization
of localities, and the availability of jobs with respect to fixed
capacities. In general, we find that the improvements from the
greedy optimization persist across these parameter settings.
Note that the results of the greedy algorithm provide a
lower bound on what can be achieved when submodularity
is taken into account. Other heuristics with access to the
submodular function might be able to further improve em-
ployment while retaining the low query complexity of the
greedy algorithm.
6 Discussion
The simulations in the previous section revealed that employ-
ment in all of our models can be improved by accounting
for submodularity. Since this effect appeared consistently
between three significantly different models of how migrants
find employment, we conjecture that similar gains can be
obtained in practice. The next logical step is to measure com-
petition effects on real migration data.
Alas, it seems to be very difficult to obtain datasets with
the necessary amount of detail. For instance, the Database
on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)5 contains data
on a vast number of migrants in different countries. However,
while File D contains information on the level of educational
attainment and on the migrants’ current occupations, there is
no information about the field of education or pre-migration
occupation. As a result, it is unclear whether an unemployed
migrant was looking for employment at all and, if so, which
job market she participated in. An additional problem is that
DIOC does not track migrants who return to their home
countries as a result of unemployment.
By contrast, longitudinal studies such as the German Socio-
Economic Panel6 contain extensive information about the
educational background of individuals. What is more, they
follow individual migrants over an extended period of time
and therefore track their success on the labor market in perfect
detail. Unfortunately, the longitudinal studies that we saw
observe too few individuals spread over too many localities.
To directly observe competition, we need data on a large
fraction of the migrants competing for jobs in a locality, from
multiple localities.
Even the paper by Bansak et al. (2018), for which the au-
thors had access to sensitive migration data, conspicuously
does not use any features relating to the refugees’ field of
occupation. Indeed, despite the predictive power of such fea-
tures for employment success in a locality, at least one major
refugee-resettlement agency in the US does not track this
information at all. We have reason to believe that the same
is true for other resettlement agencies as well. A clear pol-
icy recommendation, therefore, is to compile the records in
question and to make them available for research. Hopefully,
data on present migration will help to better direct flows of
5https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm
6https://www.diw.de/en/diw 02.c.222517.en/data.
html
migration in the future — benefitting both the migrants and
the societies they join.
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Appendix: Migration as Submodular Optimization
A Proof of Theorem 4.2
Instead of directly proving the expected employment to be submodular, it is more natural to show that the expected number of
positions that remain open is supermodular. Since a sum of supermodular functions is supermodular, it suffices to show this for a
single locality ` and profession pi. Since all agent-locality pairs will have the same locality, we can treat the set of pairs as a set of
agents. Furthermore, we will show supermodularity for an arbitrary fixed order over all agents, which implies supermodularity
for a random order.
For a set S of agents of profession pi, let o(S) denote how many of the k`pi jobs remain open in expectation if S is the set of
agents of profession pi matched with `, considered in the order fixed above. We need to show that for all sets S of agents and
distinct agents x, y /∈ S,
o(S ∪ {x, y})− o(S ∪ {y}) ≥ o(S ∪ {x})− o(S). (4)
How the process behaves at an agent i is entirely determined by the number ki of jobs still available when it is her turn and the
index ci of her first success in a sequence of coin flips. More specifically, it only matters whether ci ≤ ki (she gets a job) or
ci > ki (she fails to get any job). Without loss of generality, all ci are at most k`pi since larger values of ci will lead to the same
behavior of never getting a job. We show that Eq. (4) holds if the expectations are conditioned on fixed values of ci for all agents
i up to x or y, whoever comes later in the order. We will refer to all agents up to the later of x and y as the prefix, and to all
later agents as the suffix. Equation (4) follows from the previous proposition because the unconditional expectation is a convex
combination of the expectations conditioned on these mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive events. Fixing the coin flips of
the prefix allows us to reason about how many jobs will still be available at the first agent of the suffix, and how this differs
depending on whether x and y are present. Equation (4) will then follow from the fact that the expected number of remaining
jobs is monotone and convex in the number of jobs available at the first agent of the suffix.
A.1 Monotonicity and Convexity for a Fixed Set of Agents
Let A be a set of agents i, each with their chance pi` of success when applying for a job. Set o˜(n) for the number of positions
remaining open after starting from n available jobs and having all agents in A apply in a fixed order.
Lemma A.1. o˜ is monotone and is convex (i.e., o˜(n+ 2)− o˜(n+ 1) ≥ o˜(n+ 1)− o˜(n) for all n ∈ N).
Proof. One way of visualizing the random process with expectation o˜(n) is the following: Have a grid with n columns and one
row for each agent in A, in their fixed order. The row corresponding to i is filled with pi`-biased coins. Proceed through the cells
row by row, left to right. If the current row contains a flipped coin that was a success anywhere to the left of the current cell,
remove the current coin from the grid and proceed. This corresponds to the case where agent i already landed a job and does not
apply for further jobs. Likewise, if the current column contains a successfully-flipped coin somewhere above the current cell,
remove the current coin and proceed. This represents a job being already taken by a previous agent, which is why the current
agent cannot apply there. Otherwise, flip the coin and proceed, simulating the current agent applying for the current job.
Clearly, the total number of successful coin flips after proceeding through all cells can be interpreted as the resulting
employment number. For this reason, o˜(n) equals the expected number of columns without a successful coin flip. Note that
the probabilities of different end states of the grid do not change if we proceed through the grid in a different order, as long as
all cells to the left of and above a cell have been evaluated before dealing with the current cell. In particular, we may proceed
column by column, top to bottom.
In this interpretation, it is obvious that o˜ is monotone. Indeed, increasing its argument from n to n+ 1 corresponds to adding a
new column that will be evaluated after all others. Adding this column can increase the number of columns without successes but
cannot decrease it.
Similarly, we can now show that o˜ is convex. By linearity of expectation, the two terms o˜(n+2)− o˜(n+1) and o˜(n+1)− o˜(n)
describe the probability that column n+ 2 and n+ 1 stays without a success, respectively. Fix some coin flips for the first n
columns. To stay without success, column n + 1 must fail the coin flips in all rows that do not have a success in the first n
columns yet. In the worst case, if column n+ 1 stays without success, column n+ 2 has to satisfy the same condition. But if
column n+ 1 has a success, n+ 2 needs to fail on one less coin to stay without success. This shows that, conditional on the coin
flips of the first n columns, column n+ 2 is at least as probable to stay without success as column n+ 1. The unconditional
probabilities are obtained via a convex combination of the conditional probabilities, so the inequality persists.
A.2 Description of the Process with Fixed Coin Flips
We now formalize the interviewing process for a fixed order and fixed coin flips in some prefix of agents. A setting consists of a
sequence of integers ci for agents i and a function f˜ : N→ R. As described earlier, ci is the index of the first successful coin flip
for an agent i in the prefix, capped at a large enough constant. The function f˜ encapsulates all agents in the suffix, whose coin
flips are not fixed, by giving the expected number of left-over jobs as a function of the number of jobs that are available when
entering the suffix. Such a setting can be complemented with a number n of initially available jobs to form a program. Formally,
settings s and programs p are defined by the following Backus-Naur forms:
s ::= [f˜ ] | m; s
p ::= s {n} | r
In the above, n ∈ N is used for the number of available jobs, m ∈ N>0 is used for the ci, r ∈ R is the result of a function call,
and f˜ is an externally defined function symbol f˜ : N→ R representing the suffix.
Programs can step according to the rules of our random process: If the prefix is empty, we just evaluate the function f˜ .
Otherwise, agent i consumes a job iff ci is at most the number of available jobs. We capture this by a stepping relation 7→
between programs p, which is the smallest relation such that
• if r = f˜(n), then [f˜ ] {n} 7→ r,
• if n ≥ m, then m; s {n} 7→ s {n− 1}, and
• if n < m, then m; s {n} 7→ s {n}.
If we evaluate a program long enough, we reach a real number r, which is the expected number of remaining jobs after running
the scenario on the number of available jobs. To be able to directly speak about the final evaluation result of a program, we define
the evaluation relation ⇓ between programs and real numbers as the smallest one satisfying
• r ⇓ r, and
• if p 7→ p′ and p′ ⇓ r, then p ⇓ r.
A.3 Lemmas on Evaluation with Fixed Coin Flips
Lemma A.2. If we have m1; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→k p and m1; . . . ;mk; s′ {n} 7→k p′, then p = s {n′} and p′ = s′ {n′} for a
single value n′ ∈ N.
Proof. By induction on k ∈ N. If k = 0, the claim follows immediately for n′ = n. Else, let k > 0. Then, if n ≥ m1, we can
determine the first step of the two terms as follows:
m1; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s {n− 1} 7→k−1 p
m1; . . . ;mk; s
′ {n} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s′ {n− 1} 7→k−1 p′.
The claim about p follows from the induction hypothesis.
Else, if n < m1, we enter the analogous case of
m1; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→k−1 p
m1; . . . ;mk; s
′ {n} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s′ {n} 7→k−1 p′,
and the claim again follows from the induction hypothesis.
Lemma A.3. If we have m1; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→k p and m1; . . . ;mk; s′ {n+ 1} 7→k p′, then p = s {n′} and p′ = s′ {n′′} for
n′ and n′′ such that n′ ≤ n′′ ≤ n′ + 1.
Proof. By induction on k ∈ N. If k = 0, the claim is trivial with n′ = n and n′′ = n + 1. Else, we distinguish three cases,
depending on whether m1 ≤ n, m1 = n+ 1, or m1 > n+ 1.
If m1 ≤ n, we can uniquely determine the first step of both terms as
m1; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s {n− 1} 7→k−1 p
m1; . . . ;mk; s
′ {n+ 1} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s′ {n} 7→k−1 p′,
and the claim follows from the induction hypothesis.
If m1 = n+ 1, we know that
m1; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s {n} 7→k−1 p
m1; . . . ;mk; s
′ {n+ 1} 7→ m2; . . . ;mk; s′ {n} 7→k−1 p′,
and the claim follows from Lemma A.2.
The case of m1 > n+ 1 is analogous to the first one.
A.4 Supermodularity
We are now ready to speak about the full scenario and about how it changes depending on the presence of two prefix elements x
and y. Throughout this section, fix a monotone, convex function f˜ : N→ R. Additionally, let 1 ≤ x < y, letm1, . . . ,my ∈ N>0,
and let n ∈ N. Fix four programs:
px,y := m1; . . . ;my; [f˜ ] {n}
px¯,y := m1; . . . ;mx−1;mx+1; . . . ;my; [f˜ ] {n}
px,y¯ := m1; . . . ;my−1; [f˜ ] {n}
px¯,y¯ := m1; . . . ;mx−1;mx+1; . . . ;my−1; [f˜ ] {n}.
Additionally, let their evaluation results be
px,y ⇓ rx,y px¯,y ⇓ rx¯,y px,y¯ ⇓ rx,y¯ px¯,y¯ ⇓ rx¯,y¯.
Lemma A.4. It holds that rx,y − rx¯,y ≥ rx,y¯ − rx¯,y¯ and rx,y − rx,y¯ ≥ rx¯,y − rx¯,y¯ .
Proof of Lemma A.4. It is sufficient to prove that rx,y − rx¯,y ≥ rx,y¯ − rx¯,y¯ because we can obtain the inequality rx,y − rx,y¯ ≥
rx¯,y − rx¯,y¯ by subtracting rx,y¯ and adding rx¯,y .
By Lemma A.2, the first x − 1 steps lead to settings of the same shape and a common integer n′. Thus, we may assume
without loss of generality that x = 1.
If n < m1, px,y 7→ px¯,y and px,y¯ 7→ px¯,y¯ . Then, rx,y = rx¯,y and rx,y¯ = rx¯,y¯ , which shows the claim.
Thus, assume that m1 ≤ n. Now,
px,y 7→ mx+1; . . . ;my; [f˜ ] {n− 1}
px,y¯ 7→ mx+1; . . . ;my−1; [f˜ ] {n− 1}.
By Lemmas A.2 and A.3,
px,y 7→y−x my; [f˜ ] {n′},
px,y¯ 7→y−x [f˜ ] {n′},
px¯,y 7→y−x−1 my; [f˜ ] {n′′},
px¯,y¯ 7→y−x−1 [f˜ ] {n′′},
such that n′ ≤ n′′ ≤ n′ + 1. If n′ = n′′, then as above rx,y = rx¯,y and rx,y¯ = rx¯,y¯ , and we are done.
Assume, therefore, that n′′ = n′ + 1. If my > n′ + 1, then my; [f˜ ] {n′} 7→ [f˜ ] {n′} and my; [f˜ ] {n′′} 7→ [f˜ ] {n′′}.
Then, rx,y = rx,y¯ and rx¯,y = rx¯,y¯, which shows the claim. Else, if my = n′ + 1, then again my; [f˜ ] {n′} 7→ [f˜ ] {n′} but
my; [f˜ ] {n′′} 7→ [f˜ ] {n′}. Thus rx,y = rx¯,y = rx,y¯ = f(n′) and rx¯,y¯ = f(n′ + 1). The latter term is larger by monotonicity
of f˜ and we are done. Else, it must hold that my ≤ n′, thus my; [f˜ ] {n′} 7→ [f˜ ] {n′ − 1} and my; [f˜ ] {n′′} 7→ [f˜ ] {n′}. Now,
rx,y = f˜(n
′ − 1), rx¯,y = rx,y¯ = f˜(n′) and rx¯,y¯ = f˜(n′ + 1). The claim now follows from convexity.
A.5 Putting It All Together
Proof of Theorem 4.2. As outlined in the beginning of the proof, it suffices to show that Eq. (4) holds for a fixed order of agents,
for fixed set of agents S and other agents x and y, and for fixed coin flip indices ci for all agents i in the prefix.
By Lemma A.1, the expected number of left-over jobs is a monotone and convex function o˜ in the number of available jobs on
entering the suffix. Due to independence between the coin flips, the expectation conditioned on the coin flips is the evaluation
result of ci1 ; ci2 ; . . . ; cik ; [o˜] {k`pi}, where i1, . . . , ik are the prefix agents in their order. Potentially flipping the roles of x and y,
the inequality then follows from Lemma A.4.
B Proof of Theorem 4.3
The proof of the theorem follows rather easily from the following lemma.
Lemma B.1 (Rabanca 2016). Given a bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E), let f : 2A → N be the function that maps S ⊆ A to the
size of the maximum matching in the induced graph G[S ∪B]. Then f is submodular.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. For each agent i and job j, flip a coin with bias pij , and fix the coin flips hereinafter. As before, the
employment function is a convex combination of functions corresponding to these fixed coin flips, so it is sufficient to show that
each of these functions is submodular.
For each locality `, consider a bipartite graph G` = (N ∪ J`, E`), where J` is the set of jobs in `, and (i, j) ∈ E` if and only
if the (previously fixed) coin flip corresponding to this edge succeeded. Let f` : 2N → N be the function that maps N ′ ⊆ N to
the size of the maximum matching in the induced graph G`[N ′ ∪ J`]. By Lemma B.1, f` is submodular.
Now denote the employment function (for fixed coin flips) by g. We can write g =
∑
`∈L g`, where each g` is defined by
g`(S) := f`({i ∈ N : (i, `) ∈ S})
for all subsets of agent-locality pairs S ⊆ 2N×L. The submodularity of g` follows directly from the submodularity of f`, and
therefore g itself is submodular.
C Experiments
In the following sections, we provide more information about our simulations, namely the two experiments described in the
body of the paper and two additional ones. Besides figures and interpretations, each section links to the IPython notebook of the
corresponding experiment. These notebooks show the exact code and output of our simulation runs, and they can be downloaded
for interactive experimentation.
C.1 Number of Localities
The first experiment varies the number of localities. Its setting and the resulting diagram in Fig. 1 are described in detail in
Section 5. The corresponding notebook can be found at https://github.com/pgoelz/migration/blob/master/num localities.
ipynb.
C.2 Number of Agents
The second experiment varies the number n of agents. This modification of the setting was also described in Section 5: There are
10 localities, each with an equal cap of n/10. This experiment produced Fig. 2, but we also generated the following plots of the
absolute utilities achieved by both mechanisms:
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Please mind the different scales of the y-axes. As claimed before, the utility of the additive algorithm is very close to n/2 in
the correction model, which is the expected value of the total number of people who can potentially be brought into work,
since qualification probabilities are selected uniformly from [0, 1]. This explains why the percentage improvement of the greedy
algorithm over the additive one measured in Fig. 2 is relatively low in these settings.
The notebook for the experiment is available at https://github.com/pgoelz/migration/blob/master/num agents.ipynb.
C.3 Number of Professions
Let there be 10 localities, each with a capacity of 10. The total number of agents is set back to 100. We vary the number of
professions, each of which has at least one agent. All other agents are assigned to a uniformly chosen profession. There is a job
of the right profession for every agent, and each locality randomly receives 10 of these jobs.
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When we increase the number of professions, the gap between greedy and additive increases significantly. Our hypothesis
is that, with many professions, a high fraction of matchings are bad just because the agents’ professions do not line up with
job availability, which disproportionately disadvantages the additive algorithm. This can be observed in the following plot of
absolute employment, where the performance of the additive algorithm stagnates on a low level, nearly independently of the
model and at numbers of professions at which the greedy algorithm still achieves much higher employment.
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The corresponding notebook can be found at https://github.com/pgoelz/migration/blob/master/num professions.ipynb.
C.4 Job Availability
In the following experiment, we fix 10 localities, each with a capacity of 10. We have 100 agents, with 50 agents for each of
the two professions. Independently of the caps, we vary the number of jobs for both professions, which we distribute randomly
between the localities.
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Especially when jobs are scarce, i.e., when at least one profession has only 25 jobs for 50 agents, the greedy approach greatly
improves upon the additive one. When there is a surplus of both kinds of jobs, the gains again decrease since additive optimization
already performs well in these situations, as can be seen in the following plot of absolute utilities:
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In the correction model, the expected number of people qualifying for employment continues to be 50, which is why employment
barely increases when going from 125 total jobs to 150.
Please refer to https://github.com/pgoelz/migration/blob/master/job availability.ipynb for the simulation notebook.
C.5 Specialization
Our last setting again has 100 agents and 10 localities of capacity 10. The total number of jobs is also 10 per locality now, but we
do not distribute the jobs of the two professions randomly.
Instead, we define two kinds of localities, specialized and unspecialized ones. In an unspecialized locality, both professions
have 5 jobs each. In a specialized locality, one profession has 8 jobs, the other just 2. To keep the total number of jobs equal
between both professions, we always have s many localities specialized on profession 1 and s many specialized on profession 2,
where the specialization s is an integer between 0 and 5.
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In general, this setting seems to lead to less pronounced gains in terms of utility. Interestingly, by far the biggest improvements
can be made in the correction model, probably because the additive algorithm performs particularly bad in this setting. For
specialization levels of 3 and 4, we actually see a few cases where the additive algorithm performs slightly better than the greedy
one. Still, a majority of simulations in this setting — whose only randomness comes from the agents’ probabilities and the
sampling noise — see an improvement in utility, and the potential gains are stronger than the potential losses.
We direct the reader to https://github.com/pgoelz/migration/blob/master/specialization.ipynb for the corresponding note-
book.
